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FORCED DEDICATIONS IN CALIFORNIA
As a condition precedent to the issuance of a building permit,'
the granting of a zoning variance, 2 or the approval of a subdivision
map,3 some governmental agencies require that applicants dedicate4-
without compensation-portions of their land to public use.5  Such
"forced dedications"6 have been justified by the courts as an exercise
of the sovereign's inherent police power 7 to regulate the use and
enjoyment of private property for the promotion of public health,
safety and general welfare.8 This note will review such forced dedi-
cations in light of the California constitutional guarantee of just com-
pensation for the taking of private property.9
1 E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 197 (1966).
2 E.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4
Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
3 E.g., Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311
(1941); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Ridgefield
Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
4 Dedication: "An appropriation of land to some public use, made by
the owner, and accepted for use by or on behalf of the public." BLACK'S LAW
DicTIoNARY 500 (4th ed. 1951). In forced dedications this means that the
owner gives the public entity possessory rights and title to the land.
5 E.g., Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d 311 (1941);
Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493
(1960); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Southern
Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966); Ridge-
field Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
6 The term forced dedication as used in this note refers to dedications of
property for which no compensation is paid.
7 See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 8 (1949);
Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952). See also Johnston,
Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Ration-
ale, 52 CoRNmL L.Q. 871, 885 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Johnston].
8 See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 42, 207 P.2d 1, 8 (1949);
Brous v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164, 106 N.E.2d 503 (1952).
9 "Private property shall not be taken... for public use without just
compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner
... ." CA. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.
Protection against governmental taking of property without compensation
is guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. However, the
California Constitution imposes more rigorous standards of governmental
responsibility than does the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitution (as
made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment). See Van
Aistyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of
Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. Ray. 727, 729 (1967). Therefore, discussion
in this note will, for the most part, be limited to the California Constitution.
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Police Power v. Eminent Domain
"Forced dedication" is upheld as a valid exercise of the police
power, the result being that the government acquires land without
giving compensation.' 0 At first glance this seems to be in contra-
diction with both the California and Federal Constitutions, which
guarantee that private property shall not be taken" for public use
without just compensation. 12 In order to determine whether such a
contradiction actually exists, it is essential to have a clear understand-
ing of the theoretical differences between the police power 3 and the
eminent domain power. This is not an easy task, for the line between
the two is difficult to draw.14
Theoretically, not superimposed upon but coexisting alongside the
power of eminent domain is the police power, unwritten except in
case law. It has been variously defined-never to the concordant
satisfaction of all courts or legal scholars-and frequently it has been
inconsistently applied by different courts... sometimes, to our belief,
by the same court. The police power is described more readily than
it can be defined. 15
The prevailing view recognizes that both of these powers may
only be exercised for the promotion of the public welfare.16 The po-
lice power, however, is employed to regulate (and/or restrict) the use
and enjoyment of property,1 while eminent domain power is used
to take land for some particular use.18 It is this distinction that de-
termines whether compensation is necessary.19 If there is a "taking",
For, "in the relatively few decisions in which the Supreme Court has reviewed
state determinations of just compensation, it has intimated that considerable
deference to state law will be accorded, limited only by the minimum re-
quirements of reasonableness, fairness, and equal treatment imposed by the
fourteenth amendment." Id. at 767.
10 See Sommers v. Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523,
(1967), where the city's demand that appellant dedicate certain strips of his
property for street widening purposes, as a condition precedent to the grant-
ing of a building permit, was held a valid exercise of the police power.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. V; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14.
13 In Sommers v. Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 611, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523
527 (1967), it is noted that the police power is not static, but rather it is
flexible and expandable to meet the changing conditions of everyday life.
14 "The courts, even the highest court of the land, have despaired of
giving a satisfactory definition to the police power of a state ... ." Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 662, 137 P. 1119, 1126 (1913). See
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 351, 144 P.2d 818, 823-24 (1943).
15 Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. San Joaquin County, 257 A.C.A. 206,
211, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 40 (1967).
16 1 J. LEwis, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6 (3d ed. 1909).
17 See, e.g., 11 E. McQumLiN, THE LAW OF MuNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 32.04 (3d ed. 1964).
18 Id.
19 An exercise of police power does not necessitate compensation, whereas
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the power of eminent domain is involved, and compensation is manda-
tory.20 If, on the other hand, there is only "regulation", it is the police
power which is being used, and no compensation is required.21
At first, "taking" was defined by the relatively simple "physical
invasion" test.22 Early cases in eminent domain concluded that only
actual invasions of property could be compensable takings. 23 This
definition was later broadened by the "degree test," which indicates
"that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regula-
tion goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."24 One result of the
application of this test is that the boundary between "taking" and
"regulation" has become vague.25
When an order passes beyond proper regulation, it amounts to a tak-
ing of the property, and the order is then referable, not to the police
power but to the power of eminent domain .... Nor is it of conse-
quence that the law or order be regulatory, if, in effect, it is a taking
of property or a deprivation of the use of property within the mean-
ing of the Constitution.26
It is apparently the difficulty of when to apply this test that results in
some of the present confusion 27 with the word "taking." 28
just compensation to the landowner is constitutionally guaranteed when the
power of eminent domain is exercised. 1 J. LEwis, THE LAW OF EMINENT
DOMAIn § 6 (3d ed. 1909). See also Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 49,
207 P.2d 1, 11 (1949).
20 An exception to the constitutional requirement of compensation for a
taking is recognized in emergency situations. In this narrow exception the
government may, by exercising the police power, take private property.
Archer v. Los Angeles, 19 Cal. 2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941). However, acquiring
land by means of "forced dedication" does not fall within this exception to the
requirement of compensation, for there is no emergency to justify it. Note,
Bringle v. Board of Supervisors. Condemnation Without Compensation?, 13
HAsTixGs L.J. 401 (1962).
21 See notes 16 & 17 supra.
22 Justice Harlan suggested the physical invasion test in Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668, 669 (1887). See also Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent
Domain-Policy And Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 596, 599 (1954).
23 E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). "At one time it was
commonly held that, in the absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable
taking could occur only through physical encroachment and occupation."
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Michelman].
24 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); accord,
Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. San Joaquin County, 257 A.C.A. 206, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (1967).
25 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
26 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 663, 137 P. 1119,
1127 (1913).
27 "There is no set formula to determine where regulation ends and
taking begins." Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
28 Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. San Joaquin County, 257 A.C.A.
206, 212, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 (1967).
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The degree test would seem to have little relevance29 with re-
spect to forced dedications. It is a test for determining the point at
which a "regulation" becomes a "taking." It is not applicable to forced
dedications, which begin with an actual acquisition of land. Never-
theless, it appears that the vagueness in this area has led courts to
conclude that when a government agency acquires land by forced
dedication it is not really a "taking." This does not seem to be correct.
The "degree test" indicates only that "taking" includes more than the
mere acquisition of land;80 a regulation that amounts to a taking is
also considered a "taking."3' 1 This lends no support to the converse
of the proposition, i.e., that "taking" may include less than physical
acquisition.8 2 Yet, this is precisely what the forced dedication cases
hold. What is clearly a physical acquisition is held not to be a "tak-
ing."83 This result seems to be contrary to the clear intent of article
I, section 14 of the California Constitution. "Taking" was meant to
include at least those cases that involve physical acquisition.
[I]t should be obvious that the police power doctrine cannot be in-
yoked in the taking ... of private property in the construction of a
public improvement where no emergency exists. To hold otherwise
would in effect destroy the protection guaranteed by our Constitution
against the taking ... of private property for a public use without
compensation. 84
29 In any event, it is questionable whether the test is recognized any
more, due to the holding of Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57
Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36
(1962). The Supreme Court dismissed the case for want of a federal ques-
tion. In Consolidated Rock, the question squarely presented to the Supreme
Court was "whether zoning ordinances which altogether destroy the worth of
valuable land by prohibiting the only economic use of which it is capable
effects a taking of real property without compensation." Brief for Appellant
at 5, Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d
342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962).
30 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
81 Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 663, 137 P. 1119,
1127 (1913).
82 One author attempts to formulate a definition of "taking" by sum-
marizing the courts' approaches. "Taking is ... constitutional law's expres-
sion for any sort of publicly inflicted private injury for which the Constitu-
tion requires payment of compensation." Michelman, supra note 21, at 1165.
This definition, however, does not lead to any clear understanding of the
concepts involved since the definition is clearly circular.
33 Forced dedications "have been traditionally regarded as a species of
regulations and, thus, subject to the same constitutional limitations as zoning
and other more common forms of land regulation." Heyman & Gilhool,
The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Subur-
ban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1130 (1964).
This conclusion was reached by inserting the classic definition of police power
into the courts' holdings, i.e., that it is a regulatory function. See text
accompanying notes 20-26 supra. But why forced dedications should, in fact,
be regulations has never been clearly demonstrated.
s4 Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 730-31, 123 P.2d 505, 516 (1942).
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It seems clear that since forced dedication involves an acquisition of
land that it is a taking$5 in the constitutional sense.36
85 In Note, Bringle v. Board of Supervisors. Condemnation Without
Compensation?, 13 HAsTNrs L.J. 401 (1962), it is concluded that forced dedi-
cations are takings and require compensation.
86 In Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The
Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAr. L. REV. 727, 761 (1967), it is stated
that: "To assume that the 'taking' requirement is necessarily satisfied where
physical invasion or destruction has occurred is too broad a position, for it is
abundantly clear that total or partial physical destruction of tangible prop-
erty is not necessarily a taking." To support this point, Professor Van Alstyne
cites four cases: United States v. Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149
(1952) (oil facility blown up to prevent enemy use); Lawton v. Steele, 152
U.S. 133 (1894) (unlawfully used fish nets seized and destroyed as public
nuisance); Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) (building destroyed to pre-
vent conflagration); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d
515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962)
(value of land destroyed by zoning ordinance). Caltex and Bowditch can be
explained as being exemplary of emergency situations and therefore falling
within the exception to the constitutional requirement of just compensation.
See note 20 supra. Lawton concerns the seizure of unlawful property. The
inherent right of the sovereign to seize unlawfully used property is a well
recognized principle of law. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
In Consolidated Rock, although there was total diminution in value, no land
was actually appropriated. Therefore, it seems that none of these cases have
any bearing on the forced dedication cases.
Professor Van Alstyne recognizes the limitations upon the exception.
In Rose v. State, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 730, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942), it is stated that
the police power "generally operates [only] in the field of regulation, except
possibly in some cases of emergency .... " This was cited with approval in
Van Alstyne, Inverse Condemnation: Unintended Physical Damage, 20
HAST. L.J. 431, 435 (1969).
Other taking tests have been proposed. One is: "[W]hen an economic
loss is incurred as a result of government enhancement of its resource position
in its enterprise capacity, then compensation is constitutionally required; it is
that result which is to be characterized as a taking." Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 63 (1964). If this test were applied to forced
dedications, the conclusion would be that there is a taking. However, forced
dedications are specifically excluded from this test, because there is a recipro-
cal benefit to the landowner. Id. at 73. But Professor Sax does not justify
his exception on constitutional grounds. Nor does he explain how such an
exception would be applied. Would there be a pretrial hearing to determine
whether, in fact, the landowner was benefiting at least as much as he was
losing by the proposed dedication? If this were done, then it would be
circumventing section 1248(3) of the California Code of Civil Procedure which
specifically states that if the benefit to the landowner is greater than the dam-
ages so assessed, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation
except the value of the portion taken, but "in no event shall the benefit be
deducted from the value of the portion taken."
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Additional Judicial Justification
In addition to the theoretical difficulties37 of the police power
justification of forced dedication, there are also certain practical prob-
lems. Courts have not been content to use the police power theory as
the sole basis for their decisions. Although they hold that forced
dedication is an exercise of the police power,38 they give additional
reasons for denying compensation in forced dedication cases. As
will be seen, in some instances these secondary justifications are in
contradiction with a holding3 9 that the police power is the basis of
forced dedication.
40
The most common justification utilized by the courts in denying
compensation will be referred to in this note as the "economic benefit
theory."41 This theory consists of two parts. 42 The landowner must:
37 See text accompanying notes 22-36 supra, where the theoretical weak-
nesses are discussed.
38 "In some instances the ... effect ... is to compel a property owner to
dedicate a portion of his property to the city without receiving the compen-
sation which would be required if the property had been taken by condemna-
tion. The statutes and ordinances which bring this about have been held
constitutional under the police power." People ex rel. Department of Pub.
Works v. Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., 262 A.C.A. 371, 374, 68 Cal. Rptr.
663, 665 (1968).
39 See text accompanying notes 59-65 infra.
40 E.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 493 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51
Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966).
41 A second basis used is that of "voluntary dedication." In justifying
the policy of forced dedication, a few courts have held that dedication is
voluntary. See, e.g., Newton v. American Sec. Co., 201 Ark. 943, 148 S.W.2d
311 (1941); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Ridgefield
Land Co. v. Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928), where it is specified
that although the dedication is voluntary, the appropriation demanded by the
government must be reasonable.
"It has been suggested that since the subdivider can always retain his
land in its predeveloped condition, his decision to subdivide is voluntary
and anything he is required to give up for the privilege of subdividing he
gives freely. No taking occurs since, if he objects too strongly to the exac-
tions, he need not subdivide." G. LEFco, LAND DEVELOPMENT 327 (1966).
Apparently, Ayres is the only California case to invoke this rationale.
The holding was roundly attacked by Justice Carter in his dissent in Ayres:
"The majority [opinion] has the effect of telling the subdivider that he may
dedicate land to the city for the privilege of recording and selling-a matter
which is not a privilege, but a Tight in other situations, or let the land go idle,
or sell it and go to jail, pay a fine, or both. This, it appears to me, amounts to
a form of duress that is reminiscent of the type of practice which prevailed in
another country prior to the last great war." Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal.
2d 31, 48, 207 P.2d 1, 11 (1949). Since this line of reasoning does not seem to
have been followed in later California cases, it will not be considered further.
42 The leading cases discuss both aspects of the theory. See text ac-
companying notes 45-64 infra.
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(1) create the need for which the required dedication is to be used; and,
(2) receive direct economic benefit from the dedication.43 Apparently,
both parts are necessary for the theory to apply.44
Southern Pacific Company v. Los Angeles45 exemplifies the eco-
nomic benefit theory. It involved conditions placed on the approval
of a building permit. Plaintiffs wanted to build a warehouse with
railroad tracks extending from it across an abutting road and down
the street. The city required a dedication of land for street widening
purposes as a condition precedent to the issuance of the permit. This
was held to be a proper exercise of the police power. The court,
however, also resorted to the "economic benefit" justification for its
holding. It was concluded that the proposed warehouse would greatly
increase traffic, thereby creating the need for the widened street. It
was also pointed out that the plaintiff would benefit economically
from the street improvement. 4
6
The holding of Southern Pacific was cited in People ex rel. De-
partment of Public Works v. Curtis47 as standing for the proposition
that
[t]he decision of a planning body to require dedication for street
widening purposes will not be judicially reversed even when it ap-
pears that the dedication was made necessary by the growth of the
community. 48
Curtis seems to have ignored the specific findings by the court in
Southern Pacific that: (1) the construction of the proposed warehouse
would, of itself, greatly increase the traffic in the area; and,49 (2) the
Southern Pacific Company would benefit economically from a wid-
ened road.50 Curtis dangerously extends Southern Pacific by holding
that any damage that results from forced dedication is "noncompen-
sable because it results from a risk shared by all property holders."51
43 The court's application of this theory is discussed in text accompanying
notes 45-64 infra.
44 "The cases. . . recognize that forced dedication is a concomitant to the
development of a larger parcel, ordinarily resulting in a net economic gain to
the owner and an increased traffic burden on the neighborhood, for which the
owner should pay something." People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v.
Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., 262 A.C.A. 371, 380, 68 Cal. Rptr. 663, 668
(1968). See also Sommers v. Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 523 (1967); Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38,
49-50, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197, 203-04 (1966).
45 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966).
46 Id. at 48, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 203.
47 255 A.C.A. 418, 63 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1967).
48 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 A.C.A. 418,
424, 63 Cal. Rptr. 138, 141 (1967).
49 Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 48, 51 Cal. Rptr.
197, 203 (1966).
50 Id.
51 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 A.C.A. 418,
425, 63 Cal. Rptr. 138, 142 (1967).
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This declaration seems to effectively remove the constitutional pro-
tection of just compensation, 52 leaving the doors wide open for unlim-
ited extensions of the police powers. 3 Such is the danger of the
"economic benefit" theory.
Two other leading California cases on forced dedication are Ayres
v. City Counci 54 and Bringle v. Board of Supervisors.55 In Ayres the
court balanced the economic benefit to be gained by the landowner
against his loss that would result from the proposed dedication of the
property. This case held that it was a valid exercise of the police
power for the city council to refuse approval of a proposed subdivision
map unless land was dedicated for street widening purposes, and for
the planting of trees.56
Bringle involved a zoning variance granted on the condition that a
strip of land be dedicated for road widening purposes. Again, the
economic benefit theory was applied. Further, the plaintiff was de-
nied compensation since he "did not ... make any showing that the
need for widening the street was not related to the proposed use of the
property."57 It appears from this holding that when dedication is
demanded, the court presumes that the need for the dedicated land is
created by the proposed use of the property. The burden of proof is
put on the plaintiff as to this issue.58
The trend of these cases seems to be to consider each factual
situation by itself,59 and to deny compensation when the economic
benefit theory applies. The importance of the economic benefit
52 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14.
53 A possible further narrowing of the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation can be noted in People v. Investors Diversified Serv., Inc., 262
A.C.A. 371, 68 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1968), where the court held that proper com-
pensation in an eminent domain case would be affected by the fact that dedi-
cation of the property could probably be coerced through the withholding of
development privileges. In effect, what the court held was that the value of
certain parcels of land is nominal because dedication without compensation
could be coerced.
54 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
5 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765, 4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960).
56 "Ayres has been followed in a number of subsequent cases concerning
compulsory dedication of land for streets. Unfortunately, it is usually cited to
support the flat proposition that subdivision control requirements for street
widening are valid conditions to plat approval. Such citations fail to consider
the limited facts of Ayres; the regulations had actually benefited the sub-
divider by reducing his costs." Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactations: The Quest For a Rationale, 52 Comuz.L L.Q. 871, 893-94
(1967).
57 54 Cal. 2d at 89, 351 P.2d at 767, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
58 See id. But see Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. San Joaquin County,
257 A.C.A. 206, 217, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 44 (1967).
59 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189,
195, 309 P.2d 10, 14 (1957); Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. Co. v. San Joaquin
County, 257 A.C.A. 206, 218, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 (1967).
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theory is pointed out in Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture v. San Joaquin
County.0o In this case it was held that if there is no causal connection
between the use for which the permit is sought and the demand for the
land, the government must compensate. 1 The "economic benefit"
theory could not be used. To the same effect is a hypothetical situa-
tion presented in Southern Pacific.6 2 The court indicated that the
builder of a single family dwelling could not be forced to dedicate
part of his land without compensation. There would be a relatively
small increase in traffic from such a construction, and the benefit to
the owner from the widening of the streets would be very slight.
Therefore, the court reasoned, there would be little economic benefit
to the plaintiff, and an uncompensated forced dedication could not be
allowed.0
Mid-Way and the hypothetical in Southern Pacific demonstrate
the true relationship between the police power justification and the
economic benefit theory. The dedicator must both create the need for
the improvement and receive economic benefit from it or the police
power justification for forced dedications may not be used. 4 Thus,
one, act by the government may be an exercise of either the police
power or the power of eminent domain.- The determining factor is
whether there has been a creation of a need by, and an economic bene-
fit to, the plaintiff.
Application of this theory results in economic benefit being sub-
stituted for compensation. This, however, is in contradiction with the
police power rationale. For, any discussion of compensation is irrele-
vant when considering police power.65
The Dangers of the Judicial Rationale for Forced Dedication
Compensation is the essence of eminent domain proceedings. By
compensation, an attempt is made to restore the landowner as nearly
as possible to his previous economic position.
It is the purpose of eminent domain proceedings to distribute
throughout the community the loss inflicted upon the individual by
the making of public improvements. In the light of this public policy,
the ideal to be aimed at is that the compensation awarded shall put
the injured party in as good condition as he would have been in if the
condemnation proceedings had not occurred.66
60 257 A.C.A. 206, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967).
61 See text accompanying note 44 supra. See also Sommers v. Los
Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1967).
62 Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 50, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 197, 203-04 (1966).
63 Id.
64 See Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. San Joaquin County, 257 A.C.A.
206, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1967); Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App.
2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1966). But see People ex rel. Department of Pub.
Works v. Curtis, 255 A.C.A. 418, 63 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1967).
65 See note 19 supra.
66 Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE L.J.
221, 224-25 (1931).
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However, if forced dedications were to be brought as eminent do-
main proceedings the government agency would, by section 1248(3)
of the California Code of Civil Procedure,67 be required to make mone-
tary payment for the value of the land taken. Economic benefits to
the landowner could not be set off against the value of the land
taken. 8 By holding that forced dedication is within the police power,
and further rationalizing the denial of compensation with the eco-
nomic benefit theory, the courts are effectively circumventing this
statute.60
The courts are attempting to balance individual rights as guar-
anteed by the constitution with the needs of the community.7 0 Evi-
dence presented in Southern Pacific indicated that, due to a lack of
funds, it would take the city one hundred years to buy all the land it
needed to meet the growing needs of the community.71 In light of
this evidence, and evidence showing that the landowner would di-
rectly benefit from the dedication,72 a desirable result was achieved
in denying compensation in that particular case. The only way to
reach such a desirable result, i.e., upholding the practice of forced
dedication without compensation, is to consider it an exercise of the
police power. If these cases were classified within eminent domain,
the courts would be unable to balance the losses incurred against
the benefits obtained due to the statutory bar.7 3
However, three important problems have arisen from the judicial
practice of associating the economic benefit theory with the police
power rationale. The first is that the courts have introduced the con-
cept of compensation via economic benefit, although only on a second-
ary basis. Police power remains the primary justification. While the
courts have considered both of these bases,74 they need not do so.
Once it becomes established that forced dedication is a valid exercise
of the police power, sole reliance could be placed on this basis, with-
67 "If the benefit shall be greater than the damages so assessed, the owner
of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion
taken, but the benefit shall in no event be deducted from the value of the
portion taken." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(3).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Bringle v. Board of Supervisors, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765,
4 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d
38, 51 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1962). For a discussion of the political and economic
implications of "forced dedication", see Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitu-
tionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents
through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
71 Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 48, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 197, 203 (1966).
72 Id.
73 See note 67 supra.
74 E.g., Sommers v. Los Angeles, 254 Cal. App. 2d 605, 62 Cal. Rptr. 523
(1967); Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles, 242 Cal. App. 2d 38, 51 Cal. Rptr.
197 (1966); Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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out reference to economic benefit.
The second problem with this approach is that there is no set
procedure available to determine the losses and/or gains75 involved.
All such determinations are sheer guesswork.
The third problem concerns the inherent dangers of misusing
or overextending the police power. In 1896 Ex Parte Jentzsch warned
of the dangers inherent in the police power:
[W]hile the police power is one whose proper use makes most
potently for good, in its undefined scope and inordinate exercise lurks
no small danger to the republic. For the difficulty which is ex-
perienced in defining its just limits and bounds, affords a temptation
to the legislature to encroach upon the rights of citizens. 76
Mid-Way expressed the same concern in 1966:
The protection of private property in the 5th Amendment presupposes
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken
for such use without compensation .... When this seemingly abso-
lute protection is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural
tendency of human nature is to extend the qualification more and
more until at last private property disappears .... We are in danger
of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the public con-
dition is not enough to warrant achieving the result by a shorter cut
than the constitutional way of paying for the change. 77
The dangers inherent in the extension of the police power to forced
dedications are clearly evidenced in Curtis, 7 which held that "forced
dedication is a risk shared by all property holders.179
Conclusion
It is difficult to justify the holding that a forced dedication is a
valid exercise of the police power. There are serious constitutional
(as well as conceptual) difficulties in holding that an actual physical
acquisition of land is not a "taking." By invoking the economic bene-
fit theory to justify their holdings in forced dedication cases, the
courts themselves give evidence to the inadequacy of the police power
rationale. As has been pointed out,80 it seems that, in theory at least,
forced dedication should be treated within the power of eminent do-
main.
On the other hand, it appears that forced dedication without
monetary compensation may, in some instances, be socially desirable,
or even necessary.8 ' This seems especially fair when the landowner
75 The procedure for eminent domain is prescribed by section 1248 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure. According to this section, the plaintiff is
entitled to have a jury assess his damages.
76 112 Cal. 468, 473, 44 P. 803, 804 (1896).
77 Mid-Way Cabinet Fixture Mfg. v. San Joaquin County, 257 A.C.A. 206,
212, 65 Cal. Rptr. 37, 41 (1967).
78 People ex Tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Curtis, 255 A.C.A. 418,
63 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1967).
79 Id. at 425, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
80 See text accompanying note 65 supra.
81 See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
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both creates the need for the acquisition and receives economic bene-
fit from the consequent government program. On this basis, forced
dedication without compensation seems emminently justifiable.
But, because of the restrictions of section 1248(3) of the California
Code of Civil Procedure, 2 if forced dedication proceedings were con-
sidered as being within eminent domain, the economic benefit could
not be balanced against the value of the parcel taken. Thus, as it
presently stands, if unjustifiable payment of compensation is to be
avoided, forced dedication must be considered to be within the scope
of the police power.88
This approach presents three major problems. The first is that
the police power justification might be employed even where there
was no economic benefit.8 4 The second is that there are no fixed
tests for determining the relevant losses and/or benefits.8 5 The third
is the dangers inherent in overextending or misapplying the police
power.88
Forced dedication is a relatively recent phenomenon with which
the courts have dealt in a makeshift manner.87 The result is a glaring
contradiction that can be resolved only by legislation.8 By statute,
82 See note 67 supra.
88 See text accompanying notes 72-73 supra.
84 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
85 The purpose of the eminent domain proceedings is to determine how
much compensation should be allowed. See People ex rel. Department of
Pub. Works v. Edgar, 219 Cal. App. 2d 381, 32 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1963), where the
procedure is clearly set out. The jury is required to give the following
answers as to damages: (1) the value of the parcels taken; (2) damages by
reason of severance; (3) special benefits which accrued to the remaining
property by reason of the construction of improvements. Id. at 383, 32 Cal.
Rptr. at 893. In Edgar, since the special benefits far exceeded the severance
damages, the judgment was limited to the value of the land taken. Id. at
388-89, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 897. This is in conformity with the procedure set out
in CAL. Com Civ. PROC. § 1248.
86 See text accompanying notes 76-79 supra.
87 "The quantity of private property exposed under present law in Amer-
ica to deliberate governmental destruction without constitutional right to com-
pensation is surprisingly great. California's law in this regard, while no
worse off than other states, is little better, and is beset with statutory in-
consistencies and anomalies that resist rational explanation, save as illus-
trations of the ad hoc and episodic development of the legislative pattern.
The demands of fairness and equality in a state's dealings with its citizens
support the need for a more comprehensive legislative approach, informed by
the fundamental policy considerations that undergird the ethical and consti-
tutional duty to compensate justly when private property is taken or damaged
for public use." Van Alstyne, Statutory Modifications of Inverse Condemna-
tion: Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction, 20 STAN. L. REv. 617, 656-57
(1968).
88 Any legislative approach to the problem is subject to the state and
federal constitutional provisions relating to the taking or damaging of private
property. "For example, to the extent that article I, section 14 of the Cali-
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the present forced dedication proceedings should be brought under
eminent domain. However, in the case of forced dedication an excep-
tion should be made to the rule of section 1248(3). The loss sustained
by the dedicator should be balanced with the benefit accruing to him.
If the latter were as great as the former, no monetary compensation
would be necessary.8 9
In order for a case to come within the exception to section 1248 (3),
three requirements would have to be met: (1) The landowner must
have applied to the city for a zoning variance, a building permit or
approval of a subdivision map; (2) the city's need for the demanded
land would have to be the direct result of the dedicator's proposal,
i.e., he would have to create the need for which the land is to be
taken; and (3) the improvement made by the municipality on the
appropriated property would have to directly benefit the dedicator's
remaining property as much as, or more than, the value of the land
appropriated. All other types of eminent domain cases would remain
unchanged. 90
fornia constitution imposes more rigorous standards of governmental respon-
sibility than the fifth amendment [of the Federal Constitution] (as made
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment), realization of the
postulated legislative objective may require a state constitutional amendment
.... On the other hand, to the extent that such state standards represent
judicial elaborations of constitutional meaning unaided by legislative interpre-
tation, significant latitude for statutory initiative may exist; one of the most
conspicuous features of constitutional law is the disposition of courts to give
full effect to statutory measures designed to implement or govern the applica-
tion of broadly worded constitutional precepts." Van Alstyne, Statutory
Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19
STAx. L. REV. 727, 729 (1967). "[I]n the relatively few decisions in which
the Supreme Court has reviewed state determinations of just compensation, it
has intimated that considerable deference to state law will be accorded,
limited only by the minimum requirements of reasonableness, fairness, and
equal treatment imposed by the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 767.
89 A problem arises when there is some benefit to the landowner, but not
enough to equal the loss sustained. Two alternatives are open to the legis-
lature in dealing with this situation: (1) The benefit may be set off against
the value lost; (2) The landowner may receive full value for the land. The
courts have only considered the situation in which the landowner receives
benefits equal to or greater than the value lost. However, in Southern
Pacific it is suggested by the answer to the hypothetical that forced dedica-
tion will not be allowed if the landowner has not benefited from the dedica-
tion as much or more than he lost by it. 242 Cal. App. 2d at 50, 51 Cal. Rptr.
at 203-04 (1966).
00 Sections 11525.2 and 11546 of the California Business and Professional
Code permit dedication for specific purposes. Section 11525.2, which allows
dedication for school sites, requires that the government reimburse the dedi-
cator. Section 11546, which involves dedications for park and recreational
purposes, makes no mention of reimbursement. The proposed statute would
be subject to specific legislation such as section 11525.2. But under section
11546 the government would be exempt from paying only if the particular
case met with the specifications of the proposed legislation.
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The advantage of this proposal over the existing method of hand-
ling forced dedication cases is that it would protect the individual
landowner by requiring that in every case an attempt be made to
restore him to his previous economic position. At the same time it
would provide the courts with a rational, functional and just frame-
work within which to function.
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